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PREVENTING AN EX MA CHINA FUTURE: SEARCH
ENGINE SPEECH AND THE ADVISOR THEORY
LUKE PETTYJOHN*

Here's the weird thing about search engines. It was like
striking oil in a world that hadn't invented internal
combustion. Too much raw material. Nobody knew
what to do with it.... [Tihey were fixated on sucking it
up and monetizing via shopping and social media.
They thought that search engines were a map of what
people were thinking. But actually they were a map of
how people were thinking. Impulse. Response. Fluid.
Imperfect. Patterned. Chaotic.'
1. INTRODUCTION

This observation in the science fiction movie Ex Machina, allows Nathan, the CEO of a search engine company, to create artificial
intelligence in a humanoid robot called Ava. Under the guise of winning an employee lottery, Nathan brings Caleb, "the most talented
coder in [his] company," to his remote estate. 2 Caleb's task is to determine whether Ava "can truly think, and even feel, for herself. If
so, she will represent . . . 'the greatest scientific event in the history
of man.' 3 Through a series of interviews, Ava demonstrates the
mastery of her programming, which incorporated the search queries
of every search engine user to mimic how a human would act. She
plans her own escape and manipulates Caleb to help free her from
*Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2016; Staff
Member, FirstAmendment Law Review. I would like to thank my wife, Kate
Ortbahn, and my editor, Sheldon Stokes, without whom this piece would not exist Additionally, I would like to thank my parents for their support.
I Ex MACHINA (Film4 & DNA Films 2015).
2 Anthony Lane, Feelings: "Ex Machina" and "About Elly," NEW YORKER, (Apr. 13,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/13/feelings-cinemaanthony-lane.
3 Id. (quoting movie Ex MACHINA (Film4 & DNA Films 2015)).
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Nathan's controlling grasp. Though the movie contains other technological feats requiring a willing suspension of disbelief, such as Ava's
hard drive/brain, accepting the rapidly growing power of search engines does not. The ending of Ex Machina may be clear, but the future
of search engines and their influence on humanity remains clouded.
Twenty years ago, search engines performed the barest of
functions. They compiled lists of "ten blue links" that were direct results of users' exact search criteria.4 There were no results that had
been paid for by web sites.5 But by 2009, search engines had decided "people don't really want to search" like librarians browsing trays
of index cards; they want quick access to the information they seek.6
Search engines thus began to "rank results based only on what the
most relevant answers are for users." 7 Search engines now tell us
what we are really looking for, completing queries as we type, correcting typos, and "showing results for" what we actually intended to
search.8 It does not require science fiction to see how the power of
search engines, as protected by the First Amendment, is slipping beyond governmental control.
Courts and scholars have put forth two competing theories
for categorizing the actions of search engines: the conduit theory and
the editor theory.9 This Note attempts to outline a third, recently
proposed theory of search, the advisor theory,1 0 to determine
4

Christopher Ratcliff, 10 Blue Links: Are They Alive or Dead in Search?,

ECONSULTANCY (Jan. 30, 2014), https://econsultancy.com/blog/64228-10-blue-

links-are-they-dead-or-alive-in-search/.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Amit

Singhal, Setting the Record Straight- Competition in Search, GOOGLE PUB.
2012),
8,
(June
BLOG
POL'Y
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2012/06/setting-record-straightcompetition-in.html.
8 When attempting to search for "the mew yorker," Google will return with
"Showing results for the new yorker" and give the user the opportunity to
"search instead for" what was actually typed.
9 See James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REv. 868 (2014). Each
theory will be addressed substantively in Part IV.
10 For a complete understanding of the advisor theory, see Grimmelman, supra
note 9, which introduced the theory for the first time and applied it to search
bias cases, but left open the opportunity to apply the theory to other First
Amendment situations.

464

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

whether, the actions of search engines are deserving of First
Amendment protection. This piece ultimately suggests that courts
must employ the advisor theory and begin to view search through
the eyes of search users, rather than websites or search engines,
when deciding whether search engine functions constitute protected
speech.
Part II outlines the lineage of search engine speech from the
early American newspaper industry through today. Part III introduces two of the most recent cases where the First Amendment acted to
protect speech produced by search engines. Part IV describes the
two theories that litigants have advanced to categorize the services
that search engines provide, and explains their shortcomings. Part V
introduces the more recently proposed advisor theory, explains how
the theory would apply to the two cases introduced in Part III, and
elaborates on the implications of a failure to adopt it.

II. THE LINEAGE OF SEARCH ENGINE SPEECH

A. FirstAmendment FoundationsofSearch Engine Speech
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom of expression by prohibiting Congress from restricting the press or the rights of individuals to speak freely." The First
Amendment protections that search engine search results enjoy find
their genesis in the newspaper industry as a result of editorial judgment.12 The fact that editorial judgment concerns speech by the
press, an institutional speaker, "was understood . . . at the time the
First Amendment was ratified, for the press was even then seen as
playing a systematic role in democratic society."' 3 As a general matter, "the Government may not interfere with the editorial judgments
of private speakers on issues of public concern-that is, it may not
tell a private speaker what to include or not to include in speech

11 U.S.

CONST. amend. I.
Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of EditorialJudgment,78 NEB. L. REV.
754, 757 (1999).
13
Id.
12
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about matters of public concern." 14 That rule is not however, "restricted to the press, being enjoyed by business corporations generally and by ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated expression
as well as by professional publishers."1 5 Further, First Amendment
protections apply "whether or not a speaker articulates, or even has,
a coherent or precise message, and whether or not the speaker generated the underlying content in the first place." 16
The Supreme Court chose to address the issue of governmental interference with the editorial judgment of a newspaper in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.17 In that case, Tornillo, a candidate
for the Florida House of Representatives, sought to force Miami Herald Publishing Company to print a reply to an editorial it had published that was critical of his candidacy.' 8 Tornillo based his claim
on Florida's "right of reply" statute that "grant[ed] a political candidate a right to equal space to answer criticism and attacks on his
record by a newspaper, and ma[de] it a misdemeanor for the newspaper to fail to comply."' 9 The Court held that while the statute "did
not censor speech in the traditional sense," 20 requiring newspapers
to grant access to the message of others "imposed an impermissible
content-based burden on newspaper speech." 2 1 Such a burden resulted because, in effect, the statute deterred newspapers "from
speaking in unfavorable terms about political candidates" and "induced the newspaper to respond to the candidates' replies when it
might have preferred to remain silent." 22 Both prevented the news-

14

Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437 (2014) (citing Snyder v.
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451-52 (2011)).
1s Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,

574 (1995).

16]ian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 437 (citing Zalewska v. Cty. of Sullivan, N.Y., 316
F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2003)).
17 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
18

Id.

1

9 Id.

20

Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 436.
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653 (1994).
22 Id at 654.
21
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paper from exercising its First Amendment right to exercise "editorial control and judgment." 2 3
The Supreme Court reinforced and extended that principle
beyond the newspaper context in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston.24 In Hurley, a group of individualS 25
"authorized by the city of Boston to organize and conduct the St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade . . . refused a place in the 1993
event" to the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, a group that wished "to express its members' pride in their Irish
heritage as openly gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals." 26 The issue
was whether Massachusetts could "require private citizens who organize a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a
message the organizers do not wish to convey." 2 7 According to the
Court, allowing the state to do so would "violate[] the fundamental
rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message." 28 The Court
further explained, "'[S]ince all speech inherently involves choices
about what to say and what to leave unsaid,' one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to
speak may also decide 'what not to say."' 2 9 The Court found that
principle applied "even though the parade organizers did not themselves create the floats and other displays that formed the parade
and were 'rather lenient in admitting participants." 30 Further, a private speaker "does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by
combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to
isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the

23

]ian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 436 (quoting Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
24 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
25 The group was the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council which was an
unincorporated association of individuals elected from various veterans groups.
Id. at 557.
26

1d

Id. at 559.
28 Id. at 573.
29 Id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11, 16
(1986)).
30
ian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. at 437 (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569).
27
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speech."3 1 For that matter, "nor ... does First Amendment protection require a speaker to generate . . . each item featured in the
communication." 32
B. Applying the FirstAmendment to Search Engine Speech
Few courts have been tasked with deciding the issue. of
whether search engine search results constitute speech.33 The term
"search results" typically refers to the list created by search engines
in response to a query.34 One of the very first cases that presented
the issue was Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech, Inc.3 5 In that case,
Search King, a web site, brought an action for tortious interference
with contractual relations against Google, which ranked web sites.3 6
Search King alleged that Google maliciously decreased the ranking it
had previously assigned to Search King.3 7 The specific question at
issue was "whether a representation of the relative significance of a
web site as it corresponds to a search query is a form of protected
speech."3 8 Search King asserted a single cause of action: tortious interference with contractual relations. 39 Both Search King and Google
31

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70.

32Id

33 At the time ian Zhang was decided, "only two courts appear[ed] to have addressed the question, both concluding (albeit with somewhat sparse analysis)
that search engine results are indeed protected by the First Amendment." 10 F.
Supp. 3d at 436 (citing Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del.
2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech, Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL
21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003)).

34

Search

Result,

SEARCHMETRICS,

http://www.searchmetrics.com/glossary/search-result/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2016).
3s No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
36 Id. Google's search ranking was "controlled by a mathematical algorithm. One
component of Google's mathematical algorithm produce[d] a 'PageRank,' . . . a
numerical representation of the relative significance of a particular web site as
it corresponds to a search query." Id. Search King's suit arose because its "PageRank" was reduced or devalued and, while Google did not sell PageRanks, the
reduction of Search King's "PageRank" led to a loss in its advertising revenue.
Id.
37

Id.

38

Search King, 2003 WL 21464568, at *1.

39

Id at *2.
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conceded that the case turned on Search King's ability to demonstrate that "the interference was malicious and wrongful, and was
not justified, privileged, or excusable." 4 0 Google asserted that its actions could not be considered wrongful because the rankings of pages 41 constituted opinions protected by the First Amendment.4 2 To
support that proposition, Google relied on Jefferson County Sch. Dist
No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor'sServices, Inc.,4 3 a case holding that "First
Amendment protection extended to a financial rating service's unfavorable review of the value of a school district's refunding bonds.""
The court found the Jefferson County case analogous to the case at
hand and ultimately held that the rankings of pages were "subjective
result[s]" that constituted "constitutionally protected opinions" "entitled to full constitutional protection." 45
Four years later, Langdon v. Google, Inc.4 6 was decided. In
that case, the District Court for the District of Delaware "refused to
order Google and Microsoft to prominently list [Langdon's] site in
their search results."4 7 Langdon, the plaintiff, owned two websites:
www.NCJusticeFraud.com and www.ChinalsEvil.com. 48 The purpose
of the first was to "expose[] fraud perpetrated by various North Carolina government officials and employees, including . . . the North
Carolina Attorney General .. . ."'49 The second website was intended
to "delineate[ atrocities committed by the Chinese government."50
Langdon's complaint alleged that the search engine defendants refused to run ads on his sites and that this violated his First Amend40 Id

In that case, the search results came in the form of PageRanks, a component
of the larger search engine's mathematical algorithm, which is a "numerical
representation of the relative significance of a particular web site as it corresponds to a search query." Id. at *1.

41

42

1d

175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999).
Search King, 2003 WL 21464568, at *2 (citing id. at 852-55).
45 Id. at *4; Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: FirstAmendment Protection
for Search Engine Results, 8 J.L. EcoN. & POL'Y 883 (2012).
46 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007).
47
Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 886.
4 Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
43

44

50 Id.
soId.
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ment rights, inter alia.5 1 For relief, Langdon sought to have the defendants place his ads for his websites "in prominent places on their
search engine results and . . . 'honestly' rank [his] websites." 52
Google argued that "such relief would compel it to speak in a manner
deemed appropriate by [Langdon] and would prevent Google from
speaking in ways that [he] dislikes."5 3 The court reasoned: "The
First Amendment guarantees an individual the right to free speech,
'a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and
what not to say.' . .. [T]he injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff contravenes Defendants' First Amendment rights."5 4 Harking back to the
protections afforded newspapers5 5 the court held that "search engines cannot be forced to include links that they wish to exclude." 56
III. RECENT LITIGATION: THE CONTEXT AND CHARACTERS

Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc.

A.

In ian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc.,5 7 "a group of New York residents who advocate for increased democracy in China sue[d] one of
China's largest companies, Baidu, Inc. ('Baidu')."5 8 The plaintiffs in
that case contended that Baidu unlawfully blocked "articles and other information concerning 'the Democracy movement in China"' and
related topics from its search results in the United States. 59 The
Southern District of New York concluded that, at least in the present
circumstances, the First Amendment protects as speech the results
produced by an Internet search engine. 60

51
52

d.

Id. at 629.

53 Id
54

Id. at 629-30; Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 886.
ss See supra Part II.A.
5
6 Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 886 (citing Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 630).
s7 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
58
Id. at 434.
s9 Id. at 434-35 (citing Compl. (Docket No. 1) ¶¶ 14, 22, 2011 WL 1884450
(S.D.N.Y.)).
60
Id. at 435.
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Baidu operates a Chinese search engine service called Baidu.com. 6 1 Baidu.com "'offers multiple services to locate information,

products and services using Chinese-language search terms, such as,
search by Chinese phonetics, advanced search, snapshots, spell
checker, stock quotes, news, images, video, weather, train and flight
schedules and other local information."' 62 Baidu was purported to be
the largest search engine in China, "with an estimated more than
70% share of the Chinese-language market" as of 2010.63
Plaintiffs were "self-described 'promoters of democracy in
their writings, publications and reporting of prothrough
China
democracy events."' 64 They alleged that Baidu "conspire[d] to prevent 'pro-democracy political speech' from appearing in its searchengine results here in the United States." 65 Each plaintiff had published "articles, video recordings, audio recordings, or other publications regarding the democracy movement in China" on the Internet.66 The publications appeared in the search results of other
search engines, such as Google and Bing, but did "not appear in Baidu's search results because Baidu deliberately block[ed] them." 6 7 As
a result, the plaintiffs brought eight different claims against Baidu.6 8
In its analysis, the court noted that the question of "whether
search-engine results constitute speech protected by the First
Amendment has been the subject of vigorous academic debate." 69 it
is a subject, however, that has received "relatively little attention"
61

1d.

Id. (citing Compl. ¶ 13).
Id. (citing Baidu, Inc. v. Registers.com, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 312, 314 (S.D.N.Y.
2010)).
62
63

64Id.

65
66

Id. (citing Compl. IT 7-8, 10-12, 14-16, 20).
Id.

67 Id

10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Compl. T¶ 7-8, 10-12, 14-16, 20).
Id. at 436 (citing Grimmelmann, supra note 9; Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013); Josh Blackman, What Happens
if Data Is Speech?, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 25 (2014)); Oren Bracha & Frank
Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?Access, Fairness, andAccountability in the
Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L.REv. 1149 (2008); Volokh & Falk, supra note 45;
Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013); Michael J. Ballanco,
Comment, Searching for the First Amendment: An Inquisitive Free Speech Approach to Search Engine Rankings, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 89 (2013).
68
69
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In fact, "only two courts appear[ed] to have ad-

dressed the question, both concluding (albeit with somewhat sparse
analysis) that search engine results are indeed protected by the First
Amendment." 71 Further, the question was one of first impression in
that circuit. 72

Looking to Tornillo and Hurley,73 the court found that, in light
of the principles established therein, "there is a strong argument to
be made that the First Amendment fully immunizes search-engine
results from most, if not all, kinds of civil liability and government
regulation."7 4 The court expanded on this point:
[By] retriev[ing] relevant information from the vast
universe of data on the Internet and [organizing] it in
a way that would be most helpful to the searcher . .
search engines inevitably make editorial judgments
about what information (or kinds of information) to
include in the results and how and where to display
that information (for example, on the first page of the
search results or later). 5
In those respects, the court reasoned: "[A] 'search engine's editorial
judgment is much like many other familiar editorial judgments,' such
as the newspaper editor's judgment of which wire-service stories to
run and where to place them in the newspaper." 76 The court also
likened search engine editorial judgments to "the guidebook writer's
judgments about which attractions to mention and how to display

70

1d.

Id. (referring to Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007)
and Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL
21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003)).
71

72

73

Id

See supra Part II.
Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (citing Benjamin, supra note 69, at 1458-72;
Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 884-92).
75 Id. (citing Eric Goldman, Search Engine bias and the Demise of Search Engine
Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 192 (2006) (concluding that "search engines
make editorial judgments just like any other media company")).
76 Id. (citing Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 884; Benjamin, supra note 45, at
1467-71).
74
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them, and Matt Drudge's judgments about which stories to link and
how prominently to feature them."77
But the fact that search engines "often collect and communicate facts, as opposed to opinions," had no bearing on the court's
analysis.7 8 Rather, it based its rationale firmly on Supreme Court
precedent, noting "'[T]he creation and dissemination of information
are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. Facts, after
all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and conduct human affairs."' 7 9
The court also found the argument "that search-engine results may be produced algorithmically" to be unpersuasive for its
analysis.8 0 "After all, the algorithms themselves were written by
human beings" and "'inherently incorporate the search engine company engineers' judgments about what material users are most likely
to find responsive to their queries."8 1 Ultimately, the court was
heavily persuaded by the argument that "what is true for parades
and newspaper op-ed pages is at least as true for search engine output." 82 That is so because "when search engines select and arrange

others' materials, and add the all-important ordering that causes
some materials to be displayed first and others last, they are engaging in fully protected First Amendment expression - '[t]he presentation of an edited compilation of speech generated by other persons.'"83

The court also declined to extend" Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC,85 to the case before it. 86 In that case, cable television operators

and programmers challenged the constitutionality of the "mustcarry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 that required local broadcast stations to be
77

78

Id.
Id.

7

Id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., --- U.S. --- , 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011)).

80 I
81

82

Id. at 438-39.
Id. at 439.

83 Id. (citing Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 891 (quoting Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995))).
84 Nor did the plaintiffs in this case cite to it. Id.
85 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
86
fJan Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 439.
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carried on cable systems.8 7 In that context, the Supreme Court "applied only intermediate scrutiny."8 8 The court in this case found significant that the Supreme Court in Turner started its analysis by stating that "'[t]here can be no disagreement on an initial premise': that
cable operators, 'by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire' - that is, by exercising
editorial discretion over speech created by others - themselves 'engage in and transmit speech' protected by the First Amendment." 89
However, the Court in Turner held that an intermediate level of scrutiny was appropriate for three reasons: First, the Court found that
the cable operators were nothing more than "conduit[s] for the
speech of others, transmitting it on a continuous and unedited basis
to subscribers;" 90 second, the cable operators could choose to preclude some speakers, "giv[ing] rise to the Government's interest in
limiting monopolistic autonomy in order to allow for the survival of
broadcasters who might otherwise be silenced and consequently destroyed;" 9 1 and third, because the regulations at issue did not "imposeD a restriction, penalty, or burden by reason of the views, programs, or stations the cable operator has selected or will select," 9 2
they were content neutral.9 3 Thus, while the Court acknowledged
"that the cable operators were engaged in speech,",it "granted lesser
protection to that speech because of its less expressive nature." 94
Perhaps not considering that the court would follow the editorial judgment line of analysis rather than Turner's three-prong
analysis, the plaintiffs did not realize that the theory of their claims
would be fatal. The plaintiffs in Zhang claimed that, "Baidu exercise[d] editorial control over its search results on certain political
topics---namely, by disfavoring expression concerning the Democra-

87 Turner, 512 U.S. at 622-24.
88
Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 439.
89 Id. (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 636).
90 Turner, 512 U.S. at 629.
91 Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 577 (2011).
92 Turner, 512 U.S. at 644.
93
Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 439.
94
Id. at 439.
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cy movement in China and related subjects."9 5 The court framed the
plaintiffs' argument as "seek[ing] to hold Baidu liable for, and thus
punish Baidu for, a conscious decision to design its search-engine algorithms to favor certain expression on core political subjects over
other expression on those same political subjects." 9 6 It is for this
very reason that the court dismissed the suit, holding that "to allow
such a suit to proceed would plainly 'violate[] the fundamental rule
of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message."' 97 The court
found this conclusion to be "compelled as much by Turner as it is by
Tornillo and Hurley."98 The plaintiffs' claims failed under Turner because "'[t]here [could] be no disagreement' that Baidu [was] 'engage[d] in and transmit[ed] speech' and [was] thus 'entitled to the
protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment."' 99 The court found that to be true because the plaintiffs' "own
theory [was] that the company exercise[d] editorial discretion over
its search results and thereby" sought to "communicate messages on
a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats."' 0 0
The court further found "Turner's three principal rationales
for applying a lower level of scrutiny to the must-carry cable regulations" to be inapplicable in the case before it.10 1 Regarding the first,
"whether any search engine is a mere 'conduit' given the judgments
involved in designing algorithms to choose, rank, and sort search results" was a matter of some debate.1 02 Since the plaintiffs' "own allegations of censorship [made] clear that Baidu was 'more than a
passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising,"'
by alleging Baidu "purposely designs its search engine algorithms to
exclude any pro-democracy topics, articles, publications, and multi-

9s Id. at 440 (internal citations omitted).
961d
9 Id.
98

(citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573).

Id.

99 Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994)).
100 Id. (internal citations omitted).
10 1

Id.

102

Id. (citing Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 898-99).

-
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media coverage," the court had no trouble finding their claim "not
103
apt here."
Regarding the second Turner rationale, the court found
search engine operators to "lack the physical power to silence anyone's voices, no matter what their alleged market share may be." 104
Again, the plaintiffs shot themselves in the foot, this time with their
own publications which "[made] clear Baidu does not have the ability to block 'pro-Democracy' writings from appearing on the Internet
in this country altogether; it can only control whether it will help users find them."1 05 For that matter, "if a user is dissatisfied with Baidu's search results, he or she 'has access, with just a click of the
mouse, to Google, Microsoft's Bing, Yahoo! Search, and other general
purpose search engines, as well as to almost limitless other means of
finding content on the Internet."'1 0 6 The plaintiffs acknowledged this
in their complaint, stating that their "pro-democracy works are
widely available to the public on the Internet 'via any of the [wellknown] search engines such as Google, Yahoo, and Bing."1 07
Turner's third rationale for applying intermediate scrutiny
however, is what "put[ the final nail in the coffin" for the plaintiffs in
this case. 108 In contrast with Turner, where the regulations at issue
were found to be content neutral, the plaintiffs in this case "call[ed]
upon the Court to impose a penalty on Baidu precisely because of
what it does and does not choose to say."10 9 The court held that "to
hold Baidu liable for its editorial judgments would contravene the
principle upon which '(o)ur political system and cultural life rest':
'that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and
110
beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence."'
The court found the plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary "wholly
unpersuasive.""'

104

Id. at 441 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575).
Id

105

Id.

10 7

Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 441 (citing Volokh & Falk, supra note 45 at 898).
Id. (citing Compl., 2011 WL 1884450 (S.D.N.Y.)).
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109 Id.
110 Id. (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 641).
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First, the plaintiffs asserted in a wholly conclusory manner
that Baidu wasn't speaking, but instead "engaging in discriminatory
conduct." 1 12 Again however, the court found this assertion to be belied by the plaintiffs' "own theory of the case, which [was] that by exercising editorial discretion, Baidu favor[ed] some 'political speech'
over other 'political speech."' 1 13 Worse still, the court found the
plaintiffs' argument to be "indistinguishable from the argument rejected in Hurley."114 Just as in Hurley, "'once the expressive character' of Baidu's search results '[were] understood, it [became] apparent' that allowing Plaintiffs to sue Baidu based on the content of
those results would have 'the effect of declaring [Baidu's] speech it115
self to be the public accommodation."'
B. S. Louis Martin v. Google
More recently and far more tersely, a California state court in
San Francisco similarly found Google's search results to be constitutionally protected activity.1 16 In S. Louis Martin v. Google,117 the
owner of CoastNews.com sued Google claiming search bias, namely,
that other search engines listed his website "among the top results
on searches for topics his site covers, such as restaurant guides for
neighborhoods in San Francisco," yet similar searches on Google
didn't list his site at all. 118 According to Martin, this made competition against Google's advertisers impossible." 9 Martin also alleged
that, after successfully signing up with Google's ad service, AdSense,
the ads for a nudist retreat he placed on his site stopped displaying
because Google believed the photographs in the ad were porno-

112 Id.
13

(citing Compl., 2011 WL 1884450 (S.D.N.Y.)).

1 Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 441.
114 Id. at 442.

115

Id. (citingHurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73).
Louis Martin v. Google, Case No. CGC-14-539972 (November 13, 2014).

116 S.

117Id.
118 Beth Winegarner, Google's Search Result Ads Are Protected Speech: Judge,
PM),
3:23
2014,
13,
(Nov.
LAw360
http://www.law360.com/articles/596066/google-s-search-results-ads-areprotected-speech-judge.
119

Id.
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graphic.1 2 0 Google filed an anti-SLAPP (anti-strategic lawsuit against
public participation) motion in response.121 According to Google's
memo in support of its motion to strike, "the anti-SLAPP statute was
specifically enacted to prevent meritless suits such as this from
chilling the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech."1 22
The memo argued that Martin's claims arose "from Google's exercise
of its constitutionally protected free speech rights," where "Google's
search result order and ad placement opinions are [the] constitutionally protected speech."1 23 To support that proposition, Google
relied on Zhang, Langdon, and Search King, and further analogized
those cases to Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co.1 24 In Blatty, the California Supreme Court did not allow a book publisher to sue the New York
Times for excluding it from the best-seller list because "the creation
of the best-seller list was expression protected under the First
Amendment." 125 Relying on that notion, Google claimed that its
"search results express Google's opinion on which websites are most
likely to be helpful to the user in response to a query and are thus
fully protected by the First Amendment." 12 6 Google further claimed
that its "decisions as to whether or not to place advertisements on a
particular website also involve editorial discretion and are thus fully
protected by the First Amendment." 12 7 To bolster this claim, Google
argued that Martin's "complaint itself demonstrate[d] that Google's
conduct at issue . . took place in a public forum and [was] connected
with issues of public interest." Martin had alleged that Google, "by
exercising its right to choose where it places third-party advertise1

20

121

Id.

S. Louis Martin v. Google, Case No. CGC-14-539972 (June 17, 2014). Califor-

nia's anti-SLAPP statute provides for a special motion to strike a complaint
where the complaint arises from activity exercising the right of free speech. CAL.
Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015).
122 See Defendant's Memo of Points and Authorities ISO Mot. To Strike Complaint, Martin v. Google (2014), (No. CGC-14-5399972), 2014 WL 6478945.
123

Id.

42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1048 (1986).
Defendant's Memo of Points and Authorities ISO Mot. To Strike Complaint,
Martin v. Google (2014), (No. CGC-14-5399972), 2014 WL 6478945. Case No.
CGC-14-5399972.
124
125

126 Id.
127 Id.
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ments on websites such as [Martin's] is engaging, in a 'holy war
against certain words."' 128 Google argued that the opposite in fact is
true because Martin's suit sought "to alter Google's speech so that
[Martin's] own interests [were] served rather than those of Google
users." 129 The court agreed-with Google's assertion that Martin's
suit "challenge[d] Google's constitutionally protected speech," 3 0
"thereby shifting the burden to [Martin] to demonstrate a probability
of prevailing on the merits of the Complaint," which he failed to
do.131

IV. A GROWING

THREAT: THE FAILURE OF THE CURRENT THEORIES

Historically, there have been two competing theories advanced to categorize search engines and the services they provide:
the conduit theory and the editor theory.1 32 While proponents of
each theory claim to have users' interests at heart, neither side can
come to any agreement over how best to help them. 13 3 Ironically,
those "who start off talking about what would be best for users find
themselves drawn ... to one of these decidedly non-user-centric theories of search."1 34 Accordingly, before presenting the advisor theory as a possible solution and showing how it would apply in practice,
it is important to delineate the "implicit assumptions made by these
other theories." 135
A.

The Conduit Theory

The conduit theory argues that search engines exist "to carry
the speech of others;" 136 they have "little or no speech interest[s] of
[their] own."13 7 The conduit theory favors objectivity and "focuses
128 Id. (citing Compl.
129

¶ 7).

Id.

Order Granting Defendant Google, Inc. to Strike Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16.
13 2
See Grimmelmann, supra note 9, at 879.
131
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on what the search does."138 Individual websites rely on the conduit
theory to argue that, since search engines "exist[ to help speakers
reach audiences," the law should prevent search engines from prejudicially using their power to censor websites.1 3 9 Because it looks at
search from the eyes of individual websites, the conduit theory sees
search engine bias as inherently evil, as it "systematically and unfairly discriminate[s] against certain individuals or groups of individuals
in favor of others." 14 0 It is exactly this bias, however, on which the
editor theory relies.
B.

The Editor Theory

-

The editor theory argues that "search engines are 'media
companies' that make 'editorial choices' about what to publish."1 4 1 It
views search through the eyes of the search engine, favors subjectivity, and focuses "on what search says."142 Just as Yahoo! claimed in
2009 that "people don't really want to search,"' 4 3 a Google engineer
stated in 2011 that "in some sense when people come to Google,
that's exactly what they're asking for - our editorial judgment."144
And that is what the editor theory relies on: the view that search results are "'editorial judgments' about which websites might be of interest to users." 14 5
Under the editor theory, search engines are without a doubt
speakers because they: (1) convey information that they have prepared or compiled; (2) "direct users to material created by others, by
136 Id. at 881.

Id. at 889.

37

3

1 8Id.
1

39

140

Id.
Id. at 884 (quoting Batya Friedman & Helena Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer

Systems, 14 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. Sys. 330, 332 (1996)).
141 Id. at 885 (quoting Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of
Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 189 (2006)).
42
1 Id. at 889.
143 Ratcliff, supra note 4.
144 Id. at 885 (quoting Steven Levy, TED 2011: The 'Panda'that Hates Farms: A
Q&A with Google's Top Search Engineers, WIRED NEWS (Mar. 3, 2011, 1:36 PM),
http://www.wired.com/business/2011/03/the-panda-that-hates-farms/all/).
145 Id.
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referencing the titles of Web pages that the search engines judge to
be most responsive to the query, coupled with short excerpts from
each page;" and (3) "select and sort the results in a way that is aimed
at giving users what the search engine companies see as the most
helpful and useful information." 14 6 The third distinction is the most
valuable of the three because it "is how each search engine company
tries to keep users coming back to it rather than to its competitors."14 7, Eugene Volokh states that the "selection and sorting is a

mix of science and art" because, while "sophisticated computerized
algorithms" are employed, the "algorithms themselves inherently incorporate the search engine company engineers' judgments about
what material users are most likely to find responsive to their queries." 14 8 For this reason, Volokh claims that search engine editorial
judgment is analogous to "many other familiar editorial judgments,"
such as newspapers, guidebooks, and compilation news websites
such as DrudgeReport.com, because each must decide "[o]ut of the
thousands of possible items that could be included, which to include,
and how to arrange those that are included." 149 Volokh claims that
these "judgments are all, at their core, editorial judgments about
what users are likely to find interesting and valuable. And all these
exercises of editorial judgment are fully protected by the First
Amendment." 15 0 Accordingly, in search bias cases, when "the conduit
1
theory [meets] the editor theory,... the editor theory [wins]." 15 But
both the conduit and editor theories view search through a distorted
lens; they fail to consider what search looks like through the eyes of
the user.
V. A NEW HOPE: THE ADVISOR THEORY

To consider search through the eyes of the user, a new approach must be employed. Though the conduit and editor theories
Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for
Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 883, 884 (2012).
146
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Id. at 885.
1so Id.
151 Grimmelman, supra note 9, at 911.
149
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"differ on the details," both are speaker-centric, attempting to "identify the best information sources and make sure they can be heard
through the cacophony."1 52 The conduit theory is concerned that
"valuable and deserving speakers will be drowned out unless they
have [the] search engines' help," and the editor theory "sets up
search engines as experts in identifying the best and most useful information."153 Both "try to solve the problem of noise by amplifying
good speech."' 5 4 But search is "the single most listener-directed"
way that speakers and listeners can find each other. 155 Accordingly,
an alternate approach to categorizing speech must be employed to
effectively consider search through the eyes (or ears) of the user: the
advisor theory.
A.

The Advisor Theory

Unlike newspapers, radios, and televisions, search engines
are interactive. 156 Their results are not pre-programmed but "generated 'on the fly,' in response to a user's specific query."1 57 Having
performed one search, a user may use a search engine to perform
another.related search, refining the query "by entering modified or
additional keywords, seeing how this changes the results."158 Once
satisfied with the results, the user "goes off to a website or websites
to attend to their speech."' 59 In this way, "search results are advice:
suggestions about which websites the user should consult."1 60 Viewing search results as suggestions or advice combines the two main
goals of the conduit and editor theories: the connecting of websites
and users via search engines expressing judgments about those websites. 161 Viewing search through the eyes of the user suggests that
152Id. at 894.

Id
Is54d.

1sa
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Id
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Id. at 895.
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the conduit and editor theories are not actually in opposition, but rather two sides of the same coin. 16 2 "Search engines connect websites
and users by expressing judgments about websites." 16 3 This suggests that search engines should be characterized as "helpful, trustI
worthy advisor[s]."1 64
The advisor theory puts users' interests first and "defers to
users' choices in defining those interests." 165 It does not focus on
what search does or says, but how users search. Under the advisor
theory, users are active listeners. 16 6 Putting the users' interests first
promotes autonomy. 167 Users are able to "choose appropriate actions for achieving [their] goals," which supports the fundamental
right to "seek" information. 1 68 This seeking does not involve "mere
access to raw information, but also the ability to sort through it." 169
The conduit and editor theories are handicapped by their reliance on
the websites and search engines "to know what is best for [the] users." 1 70 The advisor theory understands that "users themselves are
better placed to know what they want and need than anyone else
is:" 1 71 To further support autonomy, users' goals, along with the
means to pursue them, must be self-chosen. 172 Accordingly, access
to information sought is of paramount importance to' autonomy because informational equality, diversity, and efficiency all stem from
it.17 3 To support this end, the advisor theory advocates for increased
access and loyalty to users from search engines.' 74
Access necessarily requires the law to promote it.175 Regulation, however, can threaten access. 176 Consider, for example, that
162
163

Id.
Id.
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Id. at 896.
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Id. at 896-97.
169 Id. at 897.
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Id. at 901.
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because holocaust denial is prohibited in Germany and insulting the
king is prohibited in Thailand, "Google frequently removes links to
these and many other kinds of content when ordered to do so by local authorities." 7 7 Such removal "directly inhibit[s] users' ability to
seek out the information they seek."' 7 8 When Baidu is required by
the Chinese government to block particular searches, it interferes
with basic preconditions of certain types of freedom. 7 9 Regulation
that limits a search engine's use "potentially degrades the quality of
8 0 But regulation has its benefits as well; "the
advice users receive."o
government [can] take steps to ensure that users are affirmatively
able to make use of good and diverse search engines, helping to provide them if the market falls short."1 81 Accordingly, to ensure access,
regulation is a necessary evil with both positive and negative implications..
Loyalty also involves regulation, but it focuses on the relationship between users and search engines rather than the conduct
of the search engine.1 8 2 James Grimmelman describes this relationship as "an inescapable information asymmetry."18 3 He explains,
"[T]he user knows more about what she wants, ... but the search en-

gine knows far more about whether anyone has put [the relevant
content] online."' 8 4 The result is "a distinctive possibility for disloyalty."' 8 5 Consider Grimmelman's example:
176Id.
177 Id
1 78 1d.

Id. at 901-02. For example, "Baidu blocks searches for information on Falun
Gong," a Chinese spiritual practice, "at the Chinese government's behest" because the Communist Party views it as a potential threat due to its size, independence from the state, and spiritual teachings. Id. (citing Ed Felten, Chinese
Internet Censorship: See It for Yourself, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Apr. 28, 2009),
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/chinese-internet-censorship-see-ityourself/; see also Seth Faison, In Beijing: A roar ofSilent Protestors, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/27/world/in-beijing-aroar-of-silent-protestors.html.
180 Grimmelman, supra note 9, at 902.
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If I search for [discount dingos] and the search engine
tells me about OtterWorld and CapybaraCentral but
not DingoMart, it has frustrated my dingo-related
goals. Perhaps worse, if the search engine directs me
to DingoBarn because it earns an undisclosed 5%
commission on referrals, it has abused my trust to
enrich itself. It is precisely because the search engine
knows more than I do about websites that it can hide
what it knows from me, or deliberately steer me to
sites that serve its goals, not mine. 1 86
This shows how "[t]he asymmetry is hard-wired into -search."18 7
The reliance on the search engine leaves the user susceptible to deception. Under the advisor theory, the law can, however, "step in to
ensure [loyalty]" by "taking action against search engines that deceive or manipulate, or coerce users."18 8
B. Preventingan Ex Machina Future
Currently, the power of search engines, as protected by the
First Amendment, is rapidly advancing beyond governmental control. This is due in large part to the fact that search engines are more
and more regularly able to rely on the editor theory, or editorial
judgment, to protect their actions.18 9 Under the editor theory, where
relevance to the user is subjectively determined by the search engine, the search engine cannot produce false results. 190 As such,
courts like those in Search King and S. Louis Martin, will continue to
"conflate(] users' normative opinions about websites with search
engines' descriptive opinions about which websites users will find
relevant." 191 Distinguishing between these two different types of

1 86 Id.
187 Id.

188 Id.
89

' See supra Part IV.
190 Grimmelman, supra note 9, at 924. Contrast this with the conduit theory,
which "regularly assert[s] that rankings are falsiflable because relevance is objective." Id. at 923.
91
1 Id. at 924.
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opinions is important because "the two kinds of opinions are protected speech for different reasons and to very different extents." 19 2
Normative opinions of users "are protected speech because
we have decided as a society to treat matters of taste and value as
questions of individual conscience rather than objective agreement." 193 This notion "respects personal autonomy while promoting
social pluralism."1 94 Freedom of expression for descriptive purposes, however, "is an instrumental goal: it helps encourage the creation
of better and more accurate knowledge about the world."1 9 5 Search
rankings fall into the latter category which "enjoy only . .. weaker,
more contingent protections."1 96 The advisor theory is able to filter
and distinguish between these two types of opinions to arrive at a
more exacting result. The current champion of the courts, the editor
theory, cannot filter and distinguish, but must resort to believing
that the search engine's opinion of relevance is infallible and thus entitled full First Amendment protections.
However, were a court to revisit S. Louis Martin1 97 or another
search bias case and apply the advisor theory rather than the editor
theory, the result would likely be the same. Martin would have to
prove that Google provided a subjectively dishonest result for the
ranking to be actionable in tort. 198 The result in Martin's case would
be the same not because the court would again inadvertently conflate the two types of opinions present, but because "it will generally
be impossible for a court to conclude that Google's assertions of relevance are wrong."' 9 9 This conclusion would result "because of the
diversity of users' (normative) opinions and the difficulty of measuring them, rather than because of the expressivity of Google's (descriptive) opinions." 20 0
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It is possible however, that in cases challenging "search engines' obligations in dealing with repressive authoritarian governments," 20 1 such-as Zhang, a different result could be reached under
the advisor theory. Some view the Zhang suit as nothing more than
"a political protest over Chinese censorship, [with] the battle . . . being waged by proxy against a private entity allegedly complying with
its government's laws." 2 02 Those viewing Zhang as a mere proxy
battle argue that; rather than bringing "private lawsuit[s] against...
commercial actor[s]" to fix government censorship, "[b]etter mechanisms would be to keep encouraging the Chinese government to rethink its policies, and to encourage the development of pro-freedom
technologies that give ChineseInternet users more choices.' 20 3 They
note that, worse still, "the lawsuit's underlying objective [was] to export our free speech norms to China." 204 But this argument also fails
to view a search from the users' eyes; it follows the path of the editor
theory in viewing search from the search engine's perspective by arguing that Baidu was "allegedly complying with its government's
laws." 2 05 And when the plaintiffs in Zhang alleged that Baidu "conspire[d] to prevent 'pro-democracy political speech' from appearing
in its search-engine results here in the United States," they were not
attempting to "export our free speech norms to China," they were
seeking to enforce them here. 2 06 The advisor theory could have offered a more exacting result.
In Zhang, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York mistakenly applied the editor theory, discarded the conduit
theory, and disregarded the advisor theory's contention that the two
can coexist. 207 When the court disregarded Turner's three-prong
201
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Eric Goldman, Of Course the FirstAmendment Protect'sBaidu's Search Engine,
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analysis, it shunned the conduit theory. When it looked to Tornillo
and Hurley and determined that a "'search engine's editorial judgment is much like many other familiar editorial judgments,' such as
the newspaper editor's judgment," 2 08 it accepted the editor theory
on its face and forgot that unlike newspapers, search engines are interactive. While itmay be true that search engines exercise those
same editorial decisions, newspapers do not generate them "'on the
fly', in response to a [reader's] specific" interest at that exact moment the way search engines do.209 "Impulse. Response. Fluid. Imperfect. Patterned. Chaotic." 210 This simple difference makes the
analogy seem strained. Had the court been less eager to focus on
what the search engine was doing or saying, and placed more emphasis on how the users were searching, it could have promoted the
users' fundamental right to "seek" information, which involved more
than the "mere access to raw information, but also the ability to sort
through it." 2 11

In the end though, the advisor theory, relying on some form
of regulation, is satisfied by the existence of other search engines by
which the plaintiffs in Zhang could find their publications online.
Even if the plaintiffs want their publications to appear on Baidu's
search results, the advisor theory is more concerned that "the government [can] take steps to ensure that users are affirmatively able
to make use of good and diverse search engines," not diverse results
on every search engine. 212 This notion accurately reflects that the
users' interest is put first, ensuring that the ability to seek information is not hindered by a search engine's judgment. The availability of a multitude of search engines adequately satisfies the advisor
theory's concern that users can sort through all of the raw information that a search engine provides access to. The advisor theory
is not interested in compelling Baidu's speech in the interest of the
plaintiffs; it is concerned with the plaintiffs having some access to
the information they seek, whether through one advisor or another.
Id. at 437-38 (citing Benjamin, supra note 68, at 1458-72; Volokh & Falk,supra note 45 at 884-92).
209 Grimmelman, supra note 9, at 895.
210 Ex MACHINA (Film4 & DNA Films 2015).
211 Grimmelman, supra note 9, at 897.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The most important point the advisor theory advocates is
that courts, too, put users' interests first when deciding cases involving First Amendment protections for search engine search results.
Now that oil has been struck, the internal combustion engine must
be properly designed to make use of it. To have the courts continue
to view First Amendment protections through the eyes of the search
engine is to always find for the search engine. Courts must begin to.
rein in the power of search engines by. considering search engine
speech through the eyes of the user and the user's opinion of what is
relevant. This is the only way an Ex Machina, all-powerful search engine future can be prevented.

